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Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of 
Comparative Law 
Christopher A. Whytock 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Functionalism is historically one of the most influential 
approaches to the study of comparative law,1 and perhaps the most 
controversial.2 According to functionalism, comparative legal 
scholars should understand different countries’ laws as solutions to 
similar social problems.3 As Ralf Michaels argues, “The functional 
method has become both the mantra and the bête noire of 
comparative law. For its proponents, functionalism offers the most, 
perhaps the only, fruitful method; to its opponents, it represents 
everything bad about mainstream comparative law.”4 Some leading 
comparative legal scholars claim that functionalism is 
“compromised” and suffering from “exhaustion,” and that new 
 
   Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I thank 
Ralf Michaels for exceptionally helpful comments on an earlier paper in which I started to 
develop the ideas about functionalism presented in this Article. 
 1. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 428–29 (1985) (calling functionalism the “modern paradigm”); 
Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 679 (2002) (describing insights of the functional 
approach as having become “generally accepted in the past fifty years”). But see Michele 
Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS 100 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003) (“[Functionalism] is one 
of the best-known working tools in comparative legal studies. . . . [But] it never represented 
the sole or even the dominant approach to comparative legal studies during the twentieth 
century. Nor is it the prevailing method today . . . .”). 
 2. See Richard Hyland, Comparative Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 184, 188 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (noting “the importance of 
functionalism, both in terms of its exceptional contributions and the intensity of the criticism it 
has provoked”). 
 3. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 
(3d ed. 1998) (describing functionalist approach). 
 4. Ralf Michaels, The Functionalist Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 340 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann 
eds., 2006) (citation omitted). 
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approaches to comparative law are needed.5 Others argue that “a 
more methodologically aware functionalism will provide us with 
better insights into the functioning of law,” and that further 
functionalist efforts would therefore be “well worth the effort.” 6 
In this Article, I argue that legal origins scholarship—though 
produced primarily by economists, not legal scholars—has a close 
affinity with functionalist comparative law.7 As such, legal origins 
scholarship puts into relief the promises and perils, the strengths and 
weaknesses, of functionalism. Legal origins scholarship therefore 
deserves the careful and critical attention of comparative legal 
scholars as they deliberate over the place of functionalism in their 
field’s future. To that end, I attempt to draw out some of the 
implications of legal origins scholarship for the functionalism debate. 
I do so by focusing on three characteristics shared by legal origins 
scholarship and functionalist comparative legal scholarship: a quest 
for better legal solutions to societal problems (Part II); a need to rely 
on causal inference (Part III); and a need to consider the cultural, 
economic, political, and social context within which legal institutions 
exist (Part IV).8 The raw material for my analysis is Konrad 
Zweigert’s and Hein Kötz’s classic statement of the functionalist 
method in their Introduction to Comparative Law,9 and the work of 
four leading legal origins scholars: Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishney.10 I will also draw on 
John Ohnesorge’s11 and Daniel Sokol’s12 contributions to this 
symposium. 
 
 5. Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 
40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 237, 239, 246 (1999). 
 6. Michaels, supra note 4, at 381. 
 7. This Article’s analysis is based primarily on the work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. 
FINANCE 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]; Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13608, 2007), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13608 [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic Consequences]. 
 8. In this Article, I use the terms “legal institutions” and “legal rules” broadly to 
include both formal and informal legal rules. 
 9. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3. 
 10. See supra note 7. 
 11. John Ohnesorge, Legal Origins and the Tasks of Corporate Law in Development, 
2009 BYU L. REV. 1619.  
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By focusing only on the three themes of better solutions, causal 
inference, and law’s context, I do not purport to provide a thorough 
critique of either functionalism or legal origins scholarship—excellent 
critical reviews of both bodies of scholarship can be found 
elsewhere.13 However, I do attempt to develop the following claim: 
that comparative legal scholars should build upon their field’s 
functionalist heritage by giving functionalism’s “better solutions” 
impulse a qualified embrace, by systematically addressing the task of 
causal inference that is a necessary part of functional analysis,14 and 
by taking law’s context seriously. I also hope to expand upon one of 
the core questions raised by Professor Ohnesorge—what can 
comparative legal scholars and legal origins scholars learn from each 
other?15 Finally, I hope to contribute to legal origins scholarship in a 
critical yet constructive way by applying to it some of comparative 
legal scholars’ leading criticisms of functionalism. 
II. BETTER SOLUTIONS 
Perhaps the most widely criticized characteristic of the functional 
method of comparative law is its emphasis on the improvement of 
legal solutions to social problems. This so-called “better solutions” 
impulse16 flows from the principle of functionality, which is the 
 
 12. D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713.  
 13. For overviews of functionalism in comparative law, see Graziadei, supra note 1; 
Hyland, supra note 2; and Michaels, supra note 4. For three of the most strongly critical views 
of functionalism, see Frankenberg, supra note 1; Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform 
and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989); and Pierre Legrand, The Same and 
the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 240 (Pierre 
Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). For an overview of legal origins scholarship by three 
of the most prominent legal origins scholars, see La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra 
note 7. For critical takes on legal origins scholarship, see, for example, Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 
(2003); and Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative 
Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007). 
 14. For an earlier exploration of the theme of causation in comparative legal analysis, see 
Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative Constitutional Law: 
Insights from Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Economy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
629 (2008). 
 15. See Ohnesorge, supra note 11, at 1619 (inquiring about the implications of legal 
origins scholarship for law and development and vice versa). 
 16. This label is based on Zweigert and Kötz’s own reference to functionalism’s utility 
for seeking “better solutions.” ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 15. It also is used by Hill 
in his critical essay on functionalism. See Hill, supra note 13, at 102 (referring to “better 
solution” comparative law). 
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foundation of functionalism as expounded by Zweigert and Kötz. 
Zweigert and Kötz assert that “the legal system of every society faces 
essentially the same problems”17 and argue that the object of 
comparison should be diverse legal solutions to those societal 
problems.18 Thus, functionalist analysis involves two preliminary 
steps: problem definition and solution identification. According to 
Zweigert and Kötz, “only rules which perform the same function 
and address the same real problem . . . can profitably be 
compared.”19 Functionality is therefore “[t]he basic methodological 
principle of all comparative law . . . . From this basic principle stem 
all other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the 
 
 17. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 34. Similarly, in a co-authored study of law in 
“radically different cultures,” Merryman and his colleagues “developed four typical social 
problems of the kind that are bound to arise in any society and examined how each of these 
problems was perceived and resolved in each of the four cultures.” Pierre Legrand, John Henry 
Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 27 (1999). 
When asked by Legrand whether he was “confident . . . that [he] could formulate the 
questions in non-ethnocentric terms,” Merryman replied, “Yes, we thought we were able to do 
that. The idea was that we would see how each problem was treated in each of the four 
cultures.” Id. 
 18. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 34. Arthur von Mehren, Rudolf 
Schlesinger and John Merryman also emphasize the functionality principle in one form or 
another. For von Mehren, 
the criterion of comparability is convergence at the functional level. Facially 
disparate institutions, principles, rules, and theories that serve similar purposes can 
be meaningfully compared. Where social, political, or economic values are shared in 
significant measure, the arrangements and intellectual structures through which 
societies seek to advance these values are comparable. 
Arthur T. von Mehren, The Comparative Study of Law, 67 TUL. CIV. L.F. 43, 43 (1991–92). 
Schlesinger’s work—including his common core of legal systems project—used a “factual 
method” focused on the comparison of how different legal systems react to similar problems. 
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 32 (1968). According to Merryman, a legal system is a sub-system of society 
whose 
principal social function is to respond to a certain range of social demands. The 
response of the legal system to the social demand can be called the ‘legal response.’ 
The legal system thus becomes the social mechanism that, in answer to a social 
demand, produces a legal response. The mechanism is composed of legal 
institutions, legal actors, and legal processes, and its internal integration and 
operation are controlled by the legal culture and secondary legal rules. 
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER 486 (1999). 
 19. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 10; see also id. at 34 (“Incomparables cannot 
usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil 
[sic] the same function.”). 
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scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative 
law, and so on.”20 
The principle of functionality not only provides methodological 
guidance for comparative legal scholars, but also provides the basis 
for what Zweigert and Kötz call “applied” comparative law.21 In this 
mode, functionalism attempts to provide advice on legal policy by 
“suggest[ing] how a specific problem can most appropriately be 
solved under the given social and economic circumstances.”22 
Zweigert and Kötz see comparative law as leading to “the discovery 
of models for preventing or resolving social conflicts,” and therefore 
provid[ing] a much richer range of model solutions than a legal 
science devoted to a single nation, simply because the different 
systems of the world can offer a greater variety of solutions than 
could be thought up in a lifetime by even the most imaginative 
jurist who was corralled in his own system.23 
“Comparative law,” as they put it, “is an ‘école de vérité’ which 
extends and enriches the ‘supply of solutions’ and offers the scholar 
of critical capacity the opportunity of finding the ‘better solution’ for 
his time and place.”24 
Other comparative legal scholars share this functionalist “better 
solutions” impulse. For Schlesinger, one use of comparative law is 
for consulting foreign solutions that might serve as models or guides: 
“[W]hen a problem is viewed in the deeper perspective made 
possible by the comparative method, a number of alternative 
solutions may come into sight.”25 Likewise, von Mehren argues that 
“[i]nsight into how other legal systems have dealt with particular 
problems not only stimulates the jurist’s imagination but reveals the 
strengths and weaknesses of particular solutions. Comparative study 
thus assists legal reform as well as lawyers’ efforts to find creative 
solutions for problems that arise in legal practice.”26 Merryman also 
 
 20. Id. at 34. 
 21. Id. at 11. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 15. 
 24. Id. 
 25. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, MIRJAN R. DAMASKA & PETER E. 
HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 15, 22 (5th ed. 1988). 
 26. Von Mehren, supra note 18, at 47; see also Arthur T. von Mehren, An Academic 
Tradition for Comparative Law?, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 624, 628 (1971) (“[Comparative 
scholarship] is useful in that it gives a better understanding of inherent strengths and 
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argues that comparative legal analysis can be a useful basis for law 
reform, at least when such efforts are aimed at the reform of one’s 
own legal institutions.27 
Legal origins scholarship also has a strong better solutions 
impulse, giving it a close affinity with functionalist comparative legal 
 
weaknesses of given institutional forms. Such understanding has considerable theoretical 
interest and may also prove of directly practical value by providing perspective and direction for 
law reform efforts.”). 
 27. Merryman thus developed his own approach to law reform based on a critical 
reformulation of the law and development movement which he called “comparative law and 
social change.” MERRYMAN, supra note 18, at 433–76. As he explained: 
The American lawyer who engages in social engineering within his own society (i.e. 
in “domestic law and development”) operates within a familiar environment, 
employing generally valid but unstated premises that are part of his natural “feel” for 
the culture. Consciously or unconsciously he is restricted by his own background to 
a range of proposals that shared experience tells him have a reasonable prospect of 
succeeding without disproportionate social costs. The proposals he does make will 
be critically evaluated by his peers and by a variety of responsible individuals and 
agencies and may not survive that evaluation (or may be significantly changed by it). 
Eventually, if the action program is adopted and put into practice it will be in the 
proponent’s own society; he and the people with whom he most closely relates will 
observe its results and experience its consequences. 
Id. at 461. 
In contrast to domestic law reform in the United States, Merryman says: 
[I]n third world law and development programs the American actor has neither a 
reliable “feel” for the local situation nor an explicit theory of law and social change 
on which to base his proposals. His only recourse is to project what is familiar to 
him onto the foreign context. There his status as “expert,” the implied superiority of 
foreign “developed” over domestic “underdeveloped” expertise, and other factors, 
give the proposals privileged status, an opportunity for lateral entry at the top 
without the disciplining need to work their way up through the community of 
scholars or through society either in the U.S. or in the “target” nation. If the 
program is implemented and is a disaster it is those in the developing nation who 
feel the impact. To the American scholar, at home, the sounds are muffled, the 
consequences attenuated, the impact softened by geographic, political and cultural 
distance. The foreign expert thus has less at stake than those in the developing 
nation. He is gambling with someone else’s money. 
Id. at 461–62. Merryman nevertheless stressed that his assessment was “not as depressing as it 
seems,” explaining: 
It was merely a way of suggesting that, at least for Americans, third world law and 
development action is premature. Until we have tested, reliable theory (i.e. tested 
and reliable vis-à-vis the target society), we will be more responsible and productive 
if we limit ourselves to third world law and development inquiry. In this way we can 
begin to build theory of the sort that may eventually provide a more satisfactory 
basis for third world action. Meanwhile, if the urge to law and development action is 
uncontrollable, and cannot be sublimated in inquiry, it can be satisfied domestically: 
the U.S. is the most appropriate society in which to pursue the American style of 
progressive social engineering through law reform. 
Id. at 463. 
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analysis. One of legal origins scholarship’s central aims is to advance 
claims about which types of legal rules are most likely to solve 
specified economic problems. Specifically, legal origins scholarship 
examines legal solutions to problems like unemployment and the 
ability of firms to obtain financing through debt and equity markets, 
and related problems like corruption and the security of property 
rights.28 
Legal origins scholarship has reached two basic conclusions. 
First, societies with different legal origins—e.g., English common 
law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian law—are 
associated with different types of legal rules.29 Second, these 
differences in legal rules affect important economic outcomes.30 One 
group of prominent legal origins scholars summarize their findings as 
follows: 
Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with a) 
better investor protection, which in turn is associated with 
improved financial development, better access to finance, and 
higher ownership dispersion, b) lighter government ownership and 
regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, better 
functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and c) 
less formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in 
turn associated with more secure property rights and better 
contract enforcement.31 
They then propose a “blueprint for reforms” based on these 
findings.32 
Comparative legal scholars have criticized functionalism’s better 
solutions tendency. This criticism also applies to legal origins 
scholarship’s similar tendency, and therefore should be taken 
 
 28. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 7, at 1132 (“[I]n this article we 
try to assess the ability of firms in different legal environments to raise external finance through 
either debt or equity.”); La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 2–3 (noting 
legal origins scholarship on corruption, unemployment, and property rights). 
 29. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 2 (“[L]egal rules 
protecting investors vary systematically among legal traditions or origins, with the laws of 
common law countries (originating in English law) being more protective of outside investors 
than the laws of civil law (originating in Roman law) and particularly French civil law 
countries.”). 
 30. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 7, at 1149 (“The results of 
this article confirm that the legal environment—as described by both legal rules and their 
enforcement—matters for the size and extent of a country’s capital markets.”). 
 31. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 20. 
 32. Id. at 60. 
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seriously by legal origins scholars. First, critics argue that 
functionalism’s better solutions tendency exaggerates the extent to 
which different societies face similar problems.33 James Whitman, 
while noting that functionalism has many strengths, argues that “it 
starts from at least one doubtful assumption: that all societies 
perceive life as presenting more or less the same social problems.”34 
Richard Hyland also finds that “the idea that the social issues the law 
is asked to resolve are so similar as to present a constant across legal 
systems is . . . highly questionable.”35 
Methodologically, the implication of this critique is that the 
potential cross-national scope of functionalist comparison might not 
be as broad as Zweigert & Kötz seem to assume.36 Substantively, the 
critique raises doubts about functionalism’s ability to determine 
which solutions are really best: a legal solution that effectively 
mitigates a problem in one society might not be appropriate for 
another society if the problem being solved in the former is different 
from the problem that needs to be solved in the latter. 
Professor Ohnesorge’s article in this symposium shows how this 
problem can manifest itself in legal origins scholarship. He argues 
that legal origins scholarship’s insistence on investor protection is 
misplaced from the perspective of some developing countries.37 
According to Professor Ohnesorge, 
It would seem that for a developing country with few successful 
corporations, the major tasks of corporate law would be to 
encourage entrepreneurs to invest their own capital in productive 
enterprises, to help them attract early-stage capital from outside 
investors as necessary, and to give them the incentives and the 
 
 33. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 312 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 
2003). 
 34. Id. at 313. 
 35. Hyland, supra note 2, at 189. 
 36. Hyland suggests that functionalism’s assumption that all societies face the same 
problems is a way of avoiding the steps necessary to determine whether or not the societies 
under comparison in fact face similar problems: 
Since the actual function and effect of legal institutions is a matter of sociological 
concern, one might imagine that an empirical investigation would be a necessary 
prelude to functionalist research in comparative law. The functionalists avoid this 
step by means of a central premise, namely that the practical problems that the law is 
asked to resolve are similar or even . . . identical across different cultures. 
Id. at 188–89. 
 37. Ohnesorge, supra note 11, at 1630–31. 
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flexibility that would allow them to take the large risks that they 
will face as they try to capture markets and to grow. This is 
particularly true when the goal is export-led growth, in which 
products must compete on international markets, the competition 
will be fierce, and risk-taking and flexibility will be at a premium. 
None of these tasks is closely related to the strength of minority 
shareholder protections in corporate law, the central concern of 
Legal Origins.38 
Professor Sokol’s article likewise suggests that the problems 
emphasized by legal origins scholars are not necessarily the same 
problems that are most pressing in all legal systems. Specifically, he 
points out that with its focus on private firms, legal origins 
scholarship has largely overlooked the widespread problem of state-
owned-enterprise governance.39 
The second criticism of the better solutions tendency is voiced by 
Jonathan Hill, who argues that the problem with comparative law as 
an approach to law reform is “obvious: [O]n what basis,” he asks, 
“are comparative lawyers qualified (or at any rate better qualified 
than lawyers whose studies are limited to their own country) to make 
evaluations of different legal systems?”40 Hill claims that 
functionalists believe they can make such judgments because their 
method is “objective.”41 However, according to Hill, this reliance on 
objectivity is misplaced.42 The problem, he argues, is that evaluating 
different legal solutions requires value judgments—for example, 
judgments about fairness and justice—but functionalism simply 
cannot provide a basis for making those judgments.43 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sokol, supra note 12, at 1716. 
 40. Hill, supra note 13, at 102. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 103. Whitman makes a related criticism: “Also problematic, in my view, is 
another implicit claim of the functionalist approach. This is the claim that it matters relatively 
little what doctrinal and procedural means are used to solve a particular problem. This claim 
understates the social consequences of the choice of one particular means over another.” 
Whitman, supra note 33, at 313 n.8. Functionalism may also overlook the distributional 
consequences of different legal rules that provide otherwise similar solutions to a problem. 
From the perspective of institutionalist theory in political science, this is the problem of “life 
on the Pareto frontier” discussed by Stephen Krasner. See Stephen D. Krasner, Global 
Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336 
(1991). The problem is that there can be multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria—in our context, 
roughly speaking, multiple equally effective legal solutions—that have different distributional 
consequences. For example, different actors may prefer different equally efficient solutions for 
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“[C]omparatists,” says Hill, “cannot avoid the fact that their 
perception of the merits and demerits of different legal systems will 
be based on a range of (often unarticulated) value-judgments.”44 
Comparative law’s failure “to provide an objective basis for 
evaluation . . . is patently clear.”45 Therefore, Hill concludes, 
“[C]omparative law in its ‘applied version’—to the extent that it 
attempts to determine the proper policy for the law to adopt—is 
faced by very serious, if not insoluble, theoretical problems.”46 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, comparative legal scholars 
should not abandon functionalism’s (and legal origins scholarship’s) 
better solutions impulse. As Whitman argues, 
Traditionally minded comparative lawyers write in ways that reflect 
the concerns and interests of the legal profession, while neglecting 
the sorts of issues that preoccupy social scientists and political 
leaders. Thus, they focus on topics like the different jurisprudential 
approaches and procedures of the common law and civil law 
traditions, while finding little to say about the role of the law in 
different socioeconomic systems. The result is that comparative law 
scholarship often seems out of tune with the dominant issues of the 
modern world. Accordingly, our first step . . . should be to shake 
free from our comfortable habit of addressing ourselves to the 
community of lawyers. Instead, we should write for a wider 
audience of readers concerned about contemporary differences in 
social and economic orientation.47 
From this perspective, discarding functionalism’s emphasis on the 
economic, political, and social consequences of legal rules, and 
rejecting the possibility of comparative legal scholarship that can help 
 
doctrinal, procedural, or other reasons that do not affect the effectiveness of the solution. See 
id. at 338. 
 44. Hill, supra note 13, at 106. 
 45. Id. at 104. 
 46. Id. at 113. Hill concedes that comparative law has some role to play in law reform 
because it fosters detachment and “scepticism about taking the assumptions and values 
underlying the English legal system for granted, and offers a greater variety of solutions than 
could be thought up in a lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his 
own system.” Id. at 105–06 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 47. James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 
117 YALE L.J. 340, 344–45 (2007); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the 
Failure of Law and Development, 39 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series Paper No. 09-0172, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1406999 
(“Law must develop and every effort should be made to help legal institutions develop in 
positive ways, with the awareness that this is a never-ending project.”). 
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inform efforts to improve the law, would be steps in the wrong 
direction. 
However, for functionalism (or legal origins scholarship) to have 
a promising future in comparative legal scholarship, it must take the 
criticisms seriously. One way to start addressing the two criticisms 
noted above would be to clarify functionalism’s ambiguous concept 
of function.48 Two ambiguities need to be resolved. First, does 
“function” refer to the intended function of a legal rule or its actual 
consequences? To “fulfill” or “perform” a function would seem to 
imply the latter.49 But the term “function” implies not just any 
consequence but some consequence that is specified or understood a 
priori. 
Second, for whom is a legal rule functional? By focusing on 
societal problems, functionalists like Zweigert and Kötz seem to 
assume that legal rules are functional for a society as such.50 Likewise, 
for Merryman the legal system is a mechanism that responds to 
societal “demands” that are expressed in primary legal rules.51 
Unfortunately, these answers beg the question. Societies are not 
monolithic; they are composed of diverse individuals and groups. 
Thus, it is difficult to speak of societal functions per se.52 Instead, we 
must speak in terms of which individuals and groups define the 
 
 48. Hill doubts that the function of a legal institution can necessarily be identified at all. 
He argues that “[t]he function of many legal institutions is . . . debatable” and that, to a large 
extent, “attempts to identify the function of legal institutions depend on subjective 
interpretations, which cannot be divorced from value-judgments.” Hill, supra note 13, at 104. 
 49. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 34 (“Incomparables cannot usefully be 
compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil [sic] the 
same function.”). 
 50. Id. Functionalists in sociology and anthropology also refer to societal functions. For 
them, a society is a “system,” a distinct entity with specific needs. As Robert Spencer put it, 
“Every society possesses what may be termed functional prerequisites, forms necessary to its 
perpetuation.” Robert F. Spencer, The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Anthropology, in 
FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE STRENGTH AND LIMITS OF FUNCTIONALISM 
IN ANTHROPOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIOLOGY 1, 15 (Don 
Martindale ed., 1965). 
 51. MERRYMAN, supra note 18, at 486. 
 52. Others also have criticized the concept of societal functions. For example, Merton 
points out the same ambiguity in sociological functionalism, noting that different individuals or 
groups may receive different benefits from institutions; that is, what is functional for some may 
not be for others. MARK ABRAHAMSON, FUNCTIONALISM 43–44 (1978); see also David 
Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 590–91 n.76 (summarizing argument that functionalists are 
“hopelessly naïve” for assuming the existence of “society as an organic entity with identifiable 
‘needs’ and ‘functions’”). 
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intended consequences of a legal institution. Functionalism proposes 
neither an answer nor a general approach to these questions. 
Therefore, rather than referring generically to a legal rule’s 
“function,” functionalist comparative legal scholars should explicitly 
distinguish between the rule’s intended function and its actual 
consequences. Both concepts are essential. Even if one is able to 
identify the consequences of a legal institution, one cannot tell if it 
has fulfilled its function unless one knows what the intended 
function is. Conversely, even if one is able to identify a legal 
institution’s intended function, one cannot tell whether it has 
fulfilled that function until one has identified the institution’s 
consequences.53 Legal rules can still be understood as attempted 
solutions to “social” problems, but only if it is understood that these 
problems are defined by individuals and groups rather than a society 
as such. 
Beyond clarifying the concept of function, the intended 
functions/actual consequences approach addresses the criticism that 
functionalism assumes that different societies face similar problems. 
It does so by transforming the assumption into a question: What 
economic, political, or social problems are different individuals or 
groups in a particular society intending to solve? This approach also 
responds to the criticism that functionalists assume that they have an 
objective basis for identifying “better” legal solutions. Rather than 
implying objectivity regarding the definition of intended functions, 
this approach acknowledges that the definition can vary both across 
and within different societies. 
There are several possible techniques which functionalist 
comparative legal scholars could use, singly or together, to pursue 
understandings of the intended functions of legal rules.54 One 
 
 53. This distinction is similar to the distinction made in traditional sociological and 
anthropological functionalist scholarship between manifest and latent functions. For brief 
explanations of this distinction, see ABRAHAMSON, supra note 5252, at 17 (sociology), and 
Spencer, supra note 50, at 6–9 (anthropology). As Abrahamson explains,  
[Latent functions] involve consequences that are neither recognized nor intended by 
participants. Thus, initiation ceremonies may change male identities even though 
neither initiates nor adult males are aware of this consequence. Manifest functions, 
by contrast, contribute to adjustment or perpetuation of a system in ways that are 
both intended and recognized by participants. 
ABRAHAMSON, supra note 52, at 17. 
 54. One technique that must not be used is to assume that simply because a legal 
institution has certain consequences, those consequences must have been intended. This 
assumption would render the principle of functionality tautological. This was considered a 
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technique, drawn from anthropology, would use interpretive 
methods.55 Another technique, inspired by political science, would 
use positive theory and empirical research to uncover the political 
interests that actually gave rise to the legal institution in question.56 
The intended function/actual consequences approach would 
recognize the relativity of the notion of “better solutions”: actual 
consequences would be assessed with reference to potentially diverse 
subjective understandings of intended functions, rather than based 
on presumptions about objective societal goals. Functionalists may 
seek to speak objectively about the actual consequences of legal 
rules; but using this alternative approach, they would evaluate those 
consequences using intended rather than supposedly objective 
functional criteria. Of course, this does not mean that comparative 
legal scholars must refrain from using normative arguments to 
critique legal institutions or their consequences. However, when 
using functionalist arguments to do so, they should clearly identify 
the intended functions they are using as criteria. 
In summary, as comparative legal scholars contemplate the future 
of their field, they should embrace functionalism’s—and legal origins 
scholarship’s—better solutions impulse to improve knowledge about 
the real-world consequences of legal rules, and to use that 
knowledge to propose improvements to those rules.57 However, 
 
problem with some variants of sociological functionalism. ABRAHAMSON, supra note 52, at 39. 
To solve this problem, Durkheim advocated the use of causal analysis to avoid the pitfall of 
equating cause and function: “the causes of [a practice] . . . are, then, independent of the ends 
it serves.” Id. at 23. This also was considered a problem with some variants of anthropological 
functionalism. As Jarvie explains, “To be told that the function of church-going is to express 
and reinforce social solidarity and that the main test of the desire to express and reinforce social 
solidarity is church-going is to get into a circle which cannot be broken in favor of a ‘deeper’ 
explanation.” I.C. Jarvie, Limits of Functionalism and Alternatives to It in Anthropology, in 
FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 50, at 18, 25. 
 55. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). For 
a brief summary of interpretive methods, see GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY 
VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
36–41 (1994). 
 56. This approach seeks to understand the actual processes that give rise to political 
outcomes, such as laws and institutions. They typically begin by asking which actors were 
involved in a decision, what their interests were, and how these interests were aggregated to 
create a policy. This type of approach could help functionalists understand the interests that in 
fact define a legal institution’s intended functions. 
 57. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that this is the only worthy goal for 
comparative legal scholars. To the contrary, diverse research agendas and methods will make 
comparative legal scholarship most vibrant and fruitful. I simply mean to argue that this aspect 
of functionalism should be a significant part of the field. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:56 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1892 
functionalist comparative legal analysis suffers from two tendencies 
that have been justifiably criticized: a tendency to assume that 
different societies face similar problems and a tendency to imply the 
ability to make objective claims about which legal solutions to those 
problems are superior. Functionalist comparative legal scholarship 
can move toward addressing these criticisms by clarifying its concept 
of function with a distinction between intended functions and actual 
consequences. This leaves open the question of how to analyze 
actual consequences. Part III addresses that question. 
III. CAUSAL INFERENCE 
While discovering intended functions is largely an interpretive 
endeavor, discerning the consequences of legal rules is a matter of 
causal inference. Even without distinguishing between intended 
functions and actual consequences, as proposed in Part II, causal 
questions and claims are at the heart of functionalist comparative 
legal analysis.58 In its theoretical form, functionalism seeks “to 
describe the causes of the legal similarities or differences” that 
comparative legal scholarship reveals.59 Thus, functionalists are 
sometimes interested in studying legal institutions as effects, and 
seeking to understand their causes. In its applied form, too, 
functionalism relies on causal questions and claims. According to 
Zweigert and Kötz, “Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign 
solution which is said to be superior, two questions must be asked: 
first, whether it has proved satisfactory in its country of origin, and 
secondly, whether it will work in the country where it is proposed to 
adopt it.”60 To answer the first question, one must have some 
 
 58. Causal questions and claims are also pervasive in other areas of comparative legal 
scholarship. For example, comparative constitutional law scholarship raises issues about the 
political and economic factors (understood as explanatory variables) that lead to different 
constitutional arrangements (the dependent variable), and the impact of those arrangements 
(now treated as explanatory variables) on outcomes such as political stability, ethnic conflict, 
fiscal deficits, and public spending (dependent variables). Whytock, supra note 14, at 631–32. 
 59. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 11. 
 60. Id. at 17; see also MERRYMAN, supra note 18, at 444–45 (“If we are to make and 
apply law in such a way as to recognize and advance specified social interests we must know 
how to bring about desired social consequences through law.”); id. at 461 (“Action in the 
arena of law and social change requires some coherent theory or program that is based on 
justifiable assumptions about the probable effects of alternative courses of action.”). Merryman 
hoped for an “explanatory comparative law,” which, in 1974, he called “very nearly a virgin 
field.” Id. at 486. The goal was “to transcend the limitations of specific legal systems in specific 
societies in the quest for more general understanding of legal behavior.” Id. at 464. He sought 
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understanding of the actual effects of a legal solution on a specified 
outcome in the country of origin; and to answer the second, one 
must have some understanding of the likely effects of a similar legal 
institution in a country that adopts it. 
This gives rise to another criticism of functionalism: 
notwithstanding the centrality of cause-and-effect relationships 
between legal rules and social problems in functionalist comparative 
legal scholarship, functionalists generally have not devoted systematic 
attention to the challenges of causal inference.61 Causal inference is 
 
to move beyond descriptive comparison to explanatory comparison having the objective of 
producing or testing general explanatory propositions. Id. at 461, 481. 
 61. See MERRYMAN, supra note 18, at 477 (emphasizing the need to take seriously the 
question of actual consequences, but lamenting that notwithstanding this hoped-for “paradigm 
shift in comparative law scholarship, . . . in all candor things have not greatly changed”); see 
also Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 125, 125 (“Most leading works in the field continue to lag behind the social 
sciences in their ability to trace causal links among pertinent variables, let alone to substantiate 
or refute testable hypotheses.”); Whytock, supra note 14, at 631–32 (arguing that comparative 
constitutional law scholars so far have done little to address the causal question in an 
empirically rigorous manner). 
Other critics go further, implying that the necessary causal inferences are not feasible. To 
engage in causal inference, the explanatory variable (legal rules) must be kept analytically 
distinct from the dependent variable (a specified social outcome). But Frankenberg argues that 
this distinction is not possible because law and society are mutually constitutive, not separate. 
See Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 423–24 (criticizing claim that “[law] can be distinguished 
from its socio-economic and politico-cultural ‘environment,’ with which it is said to interact 
causally”).  
Mark Tushnet has other reasons for questioning the feasibility of making the causal 
inferences necessary to support functionalist analysis. First, he argues that “functionalist 
analysis always omits some relevant variables.” Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1265 (1999). Tushnet is surely correct; no analysis 
of any kind can include all relevant variables. Moreover, his criticism points toward a major 
problem in causal inference: omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias occurs when the 
omission of a variable results in a causal inference which either overestimates or underestimates 
the effect of an explanatory variable. HENRY E. BRADY & DAVID COLLIER, RETHINKING 
SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 296 (2004); KING ET AL., supra note 
55, at 168–82. 
But Tushnet may be too pessimistic about the potential for causal inference under these 
circumstances, because an omitted variable only leads to biased causal inferences if that variable 
is both correlated with the key explanatory variable and has a causal effect on the dependent 
variable. KING ET AL., supra note 55, at 169. Thus, as King et al. summarize, “[W]e can safely 
omit control variables, even if they have a strong influence on the dependent variable, as long 
as they do not vary with the included explanatory variable.” Id. Thus, Tushnet is correct: 
omitted variables can pose serious problems for causal inference. But the circumstances under 
which this is a problem are limited, which is a reason for cautious optimism about the potential 
of sound functionalist analysis. 
Second, Tushnet argues that “once even a limited number of additional variables are 
taken into account, the number of cases from which one might actually learn turns out to be 
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the analysis of observed facts in order to estimate cause-and-effect 
relationships between one or more hypothesized explanatory 
variables and a specified dependent variable.62 In other words, it is 
the process of analyzing the influence that one thing has on another 
thing. Claims and assumptions about cause-and-effect relationships 
are only as reliable as the underlying causal inferences. Therefore, 
this is a criticism that functionalist scholars—and other comparative 
legal scholars asking causal questions, relying on causal assumptions, 
or making causal claims—should take seriously. 
Legal origins scholarship offers lessons—both positive and 
negative—about how comparative legal scholars can address the 
challenges of causal inference. The approach of legal origins 
scholarship has been to rely primarily on regression analysis, a 
standard statistical method for estimating the causal effects that 
hypothesized explanatory variables have on a specified dependent 
variable, while controlling for the effects of other potential 
explanatory variables.63 In many circumstances, functionalist 
 
too small to support any functionalist generalization.” Tushnet, supra, at 1265. His concern is 
about whether one can make valid inferences about the effects of a particular legal institution 
in two or more legal systems that otherwise are very different—perhaps socially, economically, 
culturally, and politically. See id. 
This criticism points to another central issue in causal inference: comparability. But 
causal inference actually depends on differences. In particular, the value of the explanatory 
variables—including the key explanatory variable and relevant control variables—must vary. 
JOHN GERRING, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY: A CRITERIAL FRAMEWORK 189 (2001); 
KING ET AL., supra note 55, at 140, 146. That is, they should not have the same values in all 
the cases being compared. The reason is that “the causal effect of an explanatory variable that 
does not vary cannot be assessed.” KING ET AL., supra note 55, at 146; see also GERRING, 
supra, at 189. Thus, it is best to test “causal hypotheses in as many diverse situations as 
possible.” KING ET AL., supra note 555, at 99. Notwithstanding variation of key variables, cases 
generally are comparable “when they respond in similar ways to similar stimuli.” GERRING, 
supra at 176. As John Gerring stresses, 
It is neither necessary nor possible for all features to be similar. Indeed, as the 
criterion of variation suggests, we do not want identical cases. . . . We should not 
conclude that a heterogeneous sample of cases . . . is undesirable unless we have 
reason to believe that such differences (a) might affect the outcome . . . , and (b) 
cannot be effectively controlled in the analysis.  
GERRING, supra, at 177. In summary, while being wisely cautious, Tushnet may be too 
pessimistic about the feasibility of making the causal inferences necessary for sound functional 
analysis. 
 62. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24–36 
(2002). 
 63. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 12–28 & tbls.1, 2 & 3 
(surveying results of regression analyses used to estimate impacts of legal origins and legal rules 
on various economic outcomes). 
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comparative legal analysis could use similar methods to estimate the 
actual consequences of a legal rule (understood as an explanatory 
variable) on a specified outcome (the dependent variable).64 
However, legal origins scholarship is neither a complete, nor 
necessarily the best, model for making the causal inferences required 
for functional analysis. First, some of the causal claims advanced in 
legal origins scholarship are based on attempts to explain previously 
observed correlations. For example, legal origins scholars first 
observed a strong relationship between different legal origins and 
particular types of legal rules, and then attempted to develop an 
explanation for this relationship.65 Moreover, Ohnesorge notes that 
legal origins scholarship’s causal hypotheses “may have been 
developed in a mood of ‘irrational exuberance’ over Anglo-American 
economic ascendance, and by people committed to a free-market 
vision of capitalism,” and criticizes this approach for failing to 
consider “a range of successful episodes of capitalist development 
when formulating the hypotheses.”66 The problem is that there is a 
difference between testing theoretically derived causal hypotheses 
and attempting to establish causal claims, but legal origins 
scholarship sometimes seems to cross from the former to the latter. I 
do not want to go too far and argue that all comparative legal 
scholarship should be deductive rather than inductive; however, 
comparative legal scholars’ causal inferences generally are more likely 
to be reliable if they are developed in a genuine spirit of theory 
testing.67 
Second, while legal origins scholarship relies principally on 
regression analysis, the best attempts at causal inference will not rely 
 
 64. See, e.g., Whytock, supra note 14, at 658–73 (using regression analysis to estimate 
the effects of constitutional rules on government spending, while noting the limits of this 
methodology). See generally Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for 
Comparative Law?, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 797 (2009) (discussing use of statistical analysis in 
comparative legal scholarship). 
 65. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 28–29 (noting that these 
correlations “require an explanation,” that their earlier articles “do not advance such an 
explanation,” and that “[i]n the ensuing years, many academics, ourselves included, [have 
sought] a theoretical foundation for the empirical evidence”). 
 66. Ohnesorge, supra note 11, at 1628. 
 67. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Toward a Scientific Understanding of International 
Conflict: A Personal View, 29 INT’L STUD. Q. 121 (1985) (arguing that deductive methods 
should be preferred). But see Stephen M. Walt, Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and 
Security Studies, 23 INT’L SECURITY 5, 31 (1999) (arguing that inductive methods are also 
important). 
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solely on quantitative or “large-N” methods, but instead will 
complement such methods with qualitative or “small-N” analysis.68 
As I have argued before, 
large-N approaches can facilitate understanding of broad patterns 
of cross-national [legal variation and various social  
consequences,] . . . allow evaluation of the extent to which 
hypotheses about the consequences of [legal variation] . . . can be 
validly generalized across countries, and provide a tool for reducing 
and estimating the extent of uncertainty surrounding a causal 
inference.69 
But “large-N approaches provide relatively little detailed knowledge 
about specific [legal institutions] and their local contexts, and are less 
readily able to trace the causal mechanisms that link [legal features] 
with political, social, or economic outcomes. Small-N methods are 
often better suited for these tasks.”70 Thus, as Ran Hirschl has 
convincingly argued, the basic principles of qualitative or “small-N” 
research design are very important for comparative legal 
scholarship.71 
Professor Ohnesorge’s and Professor Sokol’s articles demonstrate 
how valuable qualitative analysis can be in comparative law. 
Ohnesorge’s regional case study of East Asia shows that there can be 
successful economic development without the types of legal rules 
advocated by legal origins scholars.72 And Professor Sokol’s article 
defines the relevant “case” not only geographically, but also 
functionally, offering an impressive cross-national analysis of state-
owned-enterprise governance.73 
In summary, not only functionalists, but also other comparative 
legal scholars who ask causal questions, make causal claims, or rely 
on causal assumptions, should grapple systematically and explicitly 
with the task of causal inference. Legal origins scholarship is a 
positive model for comparative legal scholars insofar as it attempts to 
test its causal claims with statistical methods of causal inference. 
 
 68. Note, however, that legal origins scholars have used historical methods to seek 
explanations for the observed correlation between legal origins and legal rules. See, e.g., La 
Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 28–45. 
 69. Whytock, supra note 14, at 659. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Hirschl, supra note 61, at 132. 
 72. See Ohnesorge, supra note 11. 
 73. See Sokol, supra note 12. 
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However, when legal origins scholarship drifts from testing to 
attempting to establish causal claims, comparative legal scholars 
should be wary. Moreover, functionalist comparative legal 
scholarship would benefit from more methodological diversity than 
legal origins scholarship in its quest to take causality seriously. None 
of this is to suggest that all comparative legal scholars should ask 
causal questions or make causal claims about legal institutions; but 
when they do, they should be explicit about the process by which 
they make their causal inferences. 
IV.  LAW’S CONTEXT 
In addition to criticisms aimed at functionalism’s better solutions 
impulse and inattention to causal inference, comparative legal 
scholars have criticized functionalism for failing to take seriously the 
cultural, economic, political, and social context within which legal 
rules exist. The functionalists Zweigert and Kötz acknowledge that, 
beyond legal solutions, comparative legal scholars must consider 
“everything whatever which helps to mould human conduct in the 
situation under consideration.”74 But they argue that “when the 
process of comparison begins, each of the solutions must be freed 
from the context of its own system.”75 Thus, Günter Frankenberg 
accuses functionalists of “legocentrism”: “There is nothing outside 
legal texts and institutions for functionalists.”76 
 
 74. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 3, at 11 (citation omitted). Zweigert and Kötz 
continue: 
Sociologists of law take this for granted, since they start out from the assumption 
that human behavior is controlled by many factors other than law, but lawyers find it 
more difficult—and comparative lawyers are generally lawyers of some kind. They 
have to force themselves to be sufficiently receptive to non-legal forces which 
control conduct, and here they have much to learn from the more open-minded 
sociologists of law. 
 Id. 
 75. Id. at 44. It must be noted, however, that when it comes to explaining differences 
between solutions (as opposed to outcomes), Zweigert and Kötz clearly do appreciate the 
importance of non-legal factors: 
If we find that different countries meet the same need in different ways, we must ask 
why. This is a particularly demanding task, since the reasons may lie anywhere in the 
whole realm of social life, and one may have to venture into the domains of other 
social sciences, such as economics, sociology or political science.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 76. Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 438. 
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The so-called “organicist” critique of functionalism implies that 
this omission renders functionalist comparative legal analysis 
irrelevant, at least for law reform. The critique, which Mark Tushnet 
attributes to Montesquieu, is that only legal institutions that emerge 
organically within a society will be accepted by that society.77 As 
Tushnet explains, 
Montesquieu observed that “the political and civil laws of each 
nation . . . should be so appropriate to the people for whom they 
are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit 
another.” This comes close to an express statement that one 
constitutional system cannot learn from another.78 
A strong version of the organicist critique would imply that context 
is determinative: regardless of whether a legal rule works in one 
society, it will not work in another society because of its unique 
context—and functionalist comparative legal analysis would have 
little to contribute to law reform.79 
Even if one does not accept this deterministic version of the 
organicist critique, the implication is that functionalist law reform 
proposals are likely to lead to unintended consequences—or no 
consequences at all—if they do not take into account country-
specific contextual factors.80 The reason is that the same legal rule 
may produce different results in different countries (and perhaps no 
significant results in some countries) due to such contextual factors. 
 
 77. Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of 
Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST’L L. 325, 333 (1998). Tushnet 
does not, however, fully endorse the organicist critique, which he refers to as “clearly 
overstated.” Id. 
 78. Tushnet, supra note 61, at 1265. 
 79. See Tushnet, supra note 77, at 334 (“[A] strong organicist position . . . would argue 
that all constitutional borrowings are bound to fail.”). 
 80. See Tamanaha, supra note 47, at 4–5 (“[S]ociety is the all-consuming center of 
gravity of law and development. The term ‘society’ is used here in a capacious sense—
encompassing the totality of history, culture, human and material resources, religious and 
ethnic composition, demographics, knowledge, economic conditions, and politics. No aspect 
of law or development operates in or can be understood in isolation from these surrounding 
factors. The qualities, character, effects and consequences of law are thoroughly and 
inescapably influenced by the surrounding society. Because every legal context in every society 
involves a unique constellation of forces and factors, there can be no standard formula for law; 
a good law in one location may have ill effects or be dysfunctional elsewhere; unanticipated 
consequences are to be expected.”); see also Whytock, supra note 14, at 676 (arguing that 
“different constitutional arrangements may interact with country-specific cultural, political or 
social differences to produce unanticipated consequences”). 
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Moreover, without understanding the potentially complex 
interactions between legal rules and contextual factors, it is difficult 
to estimate the causal effects of legal rules with a useful degree of 
certainty. 
Legal origins scholarship provides a model—albeit an imperfect 
one—to which functionalist comparative legal scholars can refer as 
they orient their efforts to respond constructively to these criticisms. 
In particular, the concept of “legal origins” draws attention to the 
relationship between legal rules and the economic, political, and 
social context in which those rules exist. Legal origins scholars define 
legal origins as “highly persistent systems of social control of 
economic life,”81 and posit that these systems generally are 
exogenous to a given country.82 In legal origins scholarship, legal 
origins are analytically distinct from legal rules: legal origins, an 
explanatory variable, have “strong and pervasive effects” on legal 
rules, a dependent variable.83 Although legal origins scholarship 
attempts to account for a variety of contextual factors surrounding 
the law—typically by including them as control variables in 
regression analyses—the most important contextual factor in legal 
origins scholarship is a country’s legal origin.84 
In the abstract, then, it might seem that comparative legal 
scholars should embrace this aspect of legal origins scholarship. 
However, there are at least two reasons why comparative legal 
scholars should be hesitant to follow this model too closely. The first 
has to do with how legal origins scholars operationalize the concept 
of legal origins. Rather than attempting to independently identify 
“highly persistent systems of social control of economic life,” they 
equate these systems with four different “legal traditions” identified 
by comparative legal scholars: common law, French civil law, 
 
 81. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 63–64. 
 82. See id. at 2 (arguing that “legal traditions were typically introduced into various 
countries through conquest and colonization, and as such were largely exogenous”); id. at 7 
(“The key feature of legal traditions is that they have been transplanted, typically though not 
always through conquest or colonization, from relatively few mother countries to the rest of 
the world. . . . [This] legal transplantation represents [a] kind of involuntary information 
transmission . . . .”); id. at 20 (stating that “legal origins are . . . exogenous”). 
 83. See id. at 5 (noting “the strong and pervasive effects of legal origins on diverse areas 
of law and regulation”); id. at 12 (noting “the links from legal origins to particular legal 
rules”). 
 84. See, e.g., id. at tbl.V (controlling not only for legal origin, but also gross domestic 
product, the power of left political parties, and whether there is a proportional representation 
electoral system). 
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German civil law, and the Scandinavian tradition.85 Thus, in their 
regression analyses, legal origins are measured by indicator variables 
for each of these legal traditions.86 The problem is that this approach 
to legal classification no longer describes the principal differences 
between legal systems with much accuracy.87 Furthermore, as 
Whitman argues, the civil law-common law classification is based on 
technical legal distinctions regarding different legal systems’ principal 
sources of law and basic procedural characteristics.88 These 
distinctions seem to shed little light on the economic problems that 
concern legal origins scholars.89 The lesson for comparative legal 
scholars is that taking context seriously requires not only careful, 
theoretically-informed concepts of relevant contextual factors, but 
also appropriate operationalization of those factors so that the 
variables used in a comparative analysis correspond as closely as 
possible to those concepts.90 
Second, legal origins scholarship is ambiguous regarding the role 
of contextual factors. This ambiguity stems from a tension between 
legal origins scholarship’s two distinct research agendas. One agenda 
is to establish the link between legal rules and economic outcomes. 
For example, legal origins scholars have analyzed the impact of 
investor protection laws on the development of financial markets.91 
 
 85. See id. at 5–12. 
 86. See id. at tbls.I–V (each using indicator variables for common law, civil law, or 
Scandinavian legal tradition to operationalize legal origins). 
 87. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal 
Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 10–12 (1997) (critiquing the traditional civil law-common law 
distinction). 
 88. Whitman, supra note 47, at 350–51. 
 89. Id. Whitman elaborates: 
Why did these economists [referring to legal origins scholars] not focus on the 
socioeconomic functions of the law? Why did they think the divide between the 
common law and civil law “families” was so important? The answer is that when 
they sat down to do their research, they found a comparative law literature that 
insisted that the common law-civil law divide was what mattered. They can hardly be 
blamed for believing what they read. 
Id. at 351. 
 90. See KING ET AL., supra note 55, at 111 (“[O]ur abstract and general terms must be 
connected to specific measurable concepts at some point to allow empirical testing. The fact of 
that connection—and the distance that must be traversed to make it—must always be kept in 
mind and made explicit.”). 
 91. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 7, at 1149 (exploring how 
“legal rules and their enforcement–matters for the size and extent of a country’s capital 
markets”). 
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In early legal origins scholarship, this legal rules-economic outcomes 
agenda seemed to have priority: the goal was to test hypotheses 
derived from law-and-finance theory about the impact of different 
legal rules on financial development.92 According to legal origins 
scholars, their findings point to “a blueprint for reforms” that can 
help countries improve the efficiency of their legal rules.93 
The other agenda is to establish the link between legal origins—
the principal contextual factor in legal origins scholarship—and legal 
rules.94 The concept of legal origins seems to have been introduced 
primarily for methodological reasons—namely, as an instrumental 
variable for legal rules to address concerns about endogeneity and 
reverse causation.95 But the legal origins-legal rules agenda now 
 
 92. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 7, at 1126 (explaining this 
methodological role of the legal origins variable). 
 93. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 59–63 (describing legal 
origins scholarship’s reform agenda). 
 94. See id. at 63–64 (describing the “basic contribution” of legal origins scholarship as 
“the idea that legal origins . . . have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory 
framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes”). 
 95. See id. at 2–3, 12 (describing legal origins scholarship’s early use of “legal origins of 
commercial laws as an instrument for legal rules in a two stage procedure, where the second 
stage explained financial development”). La Porta et al. explain their original logic as follows: 
Even if we were to find that legal rules matter, it would be possible to argue that 
these rules endogenously adjust to economic reality, and hence the differences in 
rules and outcomes simply reflect the differences in some other, exogenous, 
conditions across countries. Perhaps some countries chose to have only bank finance 
of firms for political reasons and then adjusted their laws accordingly to protect 
banks and discourage shareholders. Some individual rules are probably endogenous. 
However, this is where our focus on the legal origin becomes crucial. Countries 
typically adopted their legal systems involuntarily (through conquest or 
colonization). Even when they chose a legal system freely, as in the case of former 
Spanish colonies, the crucial consideration was language and the broad political 
stance of the law rather than the treatment of investor protections. The legal family 
can therefore be treated as exogenous to a country’s structure of corporate 
ownership and finance. If we find that legal rules differ substantially across legal 
families and that financing and ownership patterns do so as well, we have a strong 
case that legal families, as expressed in the legal rules, actually cause outcomes. 
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 7, at 1126. 
La Porta et al. no longer advocate the two-stage instrumental variables approach. See La 
Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 12 (indicating that they now view legal 
origins “dangerous to use” as instruments because “legal origins influence many spheres of 
law-making and regulation”); id. at 63 (“We now . . . are skeptical about the use of 
instrumental variables.”). Nevertheless, they continue to insist that their use of legal origins 
addresses concerns about reverse causation, explaining that “legal origins are still exogenous, 
and to the extent that they shape legal rules protecting investors, these rules cannot be just 
responding to market development.” Id. at 20–21. 
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appears to have taken priority. The central claim in this agenda is 
that exogenously determined legal origins—again, defined as “highly 
persistent systems of social control of economic life”—have “strong 
and pervasive effects on diverse areas of law and regulation, which in 
turn influence a variety of economic outcomes.”96 The implication is 
that legal origins, not legal rules, are what ultimately dictate 
economic outcomes. This risks moving toward the strong version of 
the organicist critique.97 
Leading legal origins scholars have acknowledged that “[s]ome 
accuse us of claiming that legal origin is destiny, so any reform of 
investor protection or of other regulations short of wholesale 
replacement of the legal system is futile.”98 They insist, however, that 
the legal origins-legal rules claims are not deterministic.99 But to 
leave room for legal rules to have an independent effect on economic 
outcomes—and thus in order for comparative law reform to be a 
worthwhile enterprise—it would seem that one or both of two things 
must be true: either (1) legal origins must be more fluid and 
susceptible to change than claimed by legal origins scholars, or (2) 
legal rules must be more independent from legal origins than 
claimed by legal origins scholars. The problem for legal origins 
scholarship is that if neither of these is true, the legal rules-economic 
outcomes agenda loses policy relevance; but the more it moves in the 
direction of either of the two concessions, the more its concept of 
legal origins loses theoretical and methodological relevance. 
The more productive route would seem to be for legal origins 
scholarship to relax its quasi-deterministic claims about the impact of 
legal origins, while continuing to take seriously the importance of 
legal origins as context.100 Even without agreement on the concept of 
legal origins and its operationalization, this approach would at least 
 
 96. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 5; see also id. at 63–64 
(describing “the basic contribution” of legal origins scholarship as “the idea that legal  
origins . . . have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory framework of the society, 
as well as for economic outcomes”). 
 97. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 98. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 7, at 62. 
 99. Id. (arguing that “[t]his is not what Legal Origin Theory says”). 
 100. In fact, it appears that legal origins scholarship may be heading in this direction. See 
id. at 62 (“The theory indeed holds that some aspects of the legal tradition are so hard-wired 
that changing them would be extremely costly, and that reforms must be sensitive to legal 
traditions. Nevertheless, many legal and regulatory rules, such as entry regulations, disclosure 
requirements, or some procedural rules in litigation, can be reformed without disturbing the 
fundamentals of the legal tradition.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:56 PM 
1879 Future of Comparative Law 
 1903 
have the virtue of reminding comparative legal scholars that, due to 
country-specific contextual factors, legal rules may often be resilient 
to change. And even when formal legal rules can be changed, deeper 
patterns of economic, political, and social regulation may persist, 
thereby muting the effects of law reform or leading to unintended 
consequences. 
In summary, comparative legal scholars—particularly 
functionalist comparative legal scholars—should take context 
seriously. No analysis can account for all relevant contextual 
factors—that would be an unrealistic standard.101 But other things 
being equal, the more carefully an analysis takes into account 
contextual factors, the more certainty one should be able to have in 
the resulting inferences about the consequences of legal rules. On 
the one hand, it probably goes too far to claim that legal rules will 
necessarily fail if they are based on foreign examples instead of being 
developed entirely within a society, as implied by the strong version 
of the organicist critique and a deterministic reading of legal origins 
scholarship.102 On the other hand, it almost certainly goes too far to 
claim that certain types of legal institutions are appropriate for all 
societies.103 Functionalist comparative legal scholars should therefore 
treat the appropriateness of a particular legal institution for a 
particular country, regardless of its origins, as an open question that 
needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis in light of contextual 
factors. What is needed is a nuanced and sophisticated understanding 
of the relationship between legal rules and contextual factors, and 
how they interact to affect various economic, political, and social 
outcomes, rather than contextual determinism or one-size-fits-all 
assumptions. Even if legal origins scholarship’s particular concept or 
measurement of legal origins is problematic, its emphasis on legal 
origins can at least serve as an important reminder about the limits of 
comparative law as a law reform tool. 
 
 101. See Tushnet, supra note 61, at 1265 (“Every society’s law is tied to so many aspects 
of that society—its politics, its particular history, its intellectual life, the institutional forms in 
which its activities are conducted, and many more—that no functionalist account can identify 
and take into account all the variables that might affect the degree to which participants in one 
system can learn from the experience in others.”). 
 102. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 77, at 333 (“A strong organicist position . . . would argue 
that all constitutional borrowings are bound to fail.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Peter C. Ordeshook, Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything 
Other than the Countries They Serve?, 13 CONST. POL. ECON. 3, 22 (2002) (arguing that there 
are universal principles of democratic constitutional design). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Should comparative law abandon or build upon its functionalist 
heritage? Based on a critical evaluation of functionalism and of legal 
origins scholarship—which has a close affinity with functionalism—I 
conclude that comparative law should build upon functionalism’s 
legacy. The field should embrace functionalism’s (and legal origins 
scholarship’s) quest for a better understanding of the real-world 
consequences of legal institutions and for improved legal solutions to 
social problems.104 But future functionalist scholarship must respond 
to the claim that functionalism has a tendency to exaggerate the 
extent to which different societies face similar problems and to imply 
the ability to make objective claims about which solutions are better. 
I have argued that by distinguishing between intended functions and 
actual consequences, functionalist scholarship can begin addressing 
those criticisms. 
Moreover, because comparative legal scholarship—especially 
functionalist scholarship—frequently asks causal questions, makes 
causal claims, and relies on causal assumptions, it should devote 
more effort to the task of causal inference.105 Legal origins 
scholarship provides one model of causal inference, one largely based 
on statistical analysis. Although statistical analysis is a tool that 
functionalist comparative legal scholars can often use to their benefit, 
there is even more to be gained by combining those methods with 
qualitative analysis. The contributions of Professor Ohnesorge and 
Professor Sokol are examples of how fruitful qualitative approaches 
to comparative legal analysis can be. 
Future functionalist comparative legal scholarship should also 
strive to take law’s context seriously.106 Legal institutions are likely to 
interact with country-specific cultural, economic, political, and social 
factors. Without considering these factors, the causal inferences upon 
which functionalism relies are unlikely to be reliable, and legal 
solutions based on functional analysis are likely to lead to unintended 
consequences. Deterministic notions of context are no more likely to 
be helpful than one-size-fits-all notions of legal solutions. Future 
functionalist scholars should instead strive for a more sophisticated 
 
 104. See supra Part II. 
 105. See supra Part III. 
 106. See supra Part IV. 
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understanding of how legal institutions interact with contextual 
factors. 
None of this is to imply that functionalism should be the 
approach to comparative law. After all, different approaches are 
appropriate for different endeavors. Moreover, there are surely many 
other important lessons that functionalism can learn through critical 
engagement with legal origins scholarship, as well as other related 
fields. But a new functionalism that combines the traditional better 
solutions impulse with a refined concept of function, and that takes 
causal inference and contextual factors seriously, would have the 
potential to make valuable contributions to our understanding of law 
and to the improvement of legal institutions.107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107. For a different and more comprehensive take on what the future of functionalist 
comparative legal analysis might look like, see Michaels, supra note 4. 
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